O wen, Freyenhagen, and Martin should be lauded for bringing the complexities of competence assessment and acquired brain injury (ABI) to light. This discussion is often a difficult and vexed exercise for an array of conditions including ABI, and is usually a judgment that is critically important for determining whether or not a patient has the right to make their own decisions. There are a number of themes in their article that chime with ideas developed by Fulford (1989) about the nature of illness, and I suggest that, in addition to teasing out some subtleties of competence assessment, they have also explained, in a phenomenologically grounded way, why it is that we should consider ABI an illness.
Abilities as Fundamental to Decision-Making Capacity
Tests of competence such as those of the Mental Capacity Act (Department of Health, 2005) and McCat-T tend to converge on rather broad categories of cognitive ability, such as understanding, and the ability to weigh in the balance and appreciate (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998) . Unpacking these categories for specific patient groups via qualitative interviews is an elegant and helpful way to deepen our understanding of the condition itself as well as the abilities that are relevant to decisionmaking capacity.
The concept of 'competence,' in a general sense, is a judgment about whether or not someone has the abilities relevant to a task and at an appropriate level. So, in asking whether a driver is competent, we are in effect asking whether they have the relevant skills; things such as being attentive to road conditions, other users, and whether they have that skill at an appropriate level. In this case, the relevance sense of what the person is competent to do, is to drive. The fine-grained diminished abilities that the authors found for those with ABI clearly are relevant to problems that they might have with how they live: A number of the people spoken to describe how, after the case, they acted in ways that they now regret.
The authors do a good job in showing how such impairments might be linked back to competence to make medical decisions: For example, ABI4 thought that he was ready to go home. However, he found that he could not, because of the extent to which he was relying on his present environment to organize himself, do what he expected they would be able to once his environment changed. The authors are correct that decision-making capacity tends to be viewed as a cognitive test and it is clear that knowledge about what one can in fact do in the world is missed from it. Moreover, this seems relevant to having a diminished ability to make good decisions for oneself. However, impairments such as ABI4's illustrate the importance of engagement with the world for mental life, and are also relevant to concepts such as agency, living well, and illness.
Action Failure
In Austinian fashion, Fulford argues that at the core of our concept of illness is action failure. By this he means both the way in which illness can render us unable to perform both ordinary, 'everyday doings' and also 'functional doings.' 'Illness' can thereby be shown to be distinct from and, according to Fulford, logically prior to 'disease.' For example, it would be possible to give a complete and useful account of the way in which a hip joint is 'diseased' in terms of the impact of rheumatoid arthritis upon it. However, we could also pay attention to the pain and lack of mobility that the same hip joint produces; the ways in which the hip joint makes it difficult for that person to act. In doing so we would, pace Fulford, be giving an account of how the diseased hip joint makes the patient unwell.
It is striking how the everyday and functional activities of the patients the authors spoke with demonstrate how what they retrospectively think they should have done is not what they were able to do at the time. For example, ABI2 has metacognition: He is aware that he is impulsive and that what he sometimes does causes problems for himself and others, yet despite his retrospective insight, he is unable to change what he does in such situations. The authors describe this as if his metacognition were "floating on the decision making like a thin layer of foam" (p.14). It seems reasonable to view this via the lens of action failure: There is a contextualized and practical problem that leads to ABI2 not being able to do what he thinks he should. This is also a resonance with the authors' remarks about the decision situation. They point out that making a decision is not something that occurs solely within the head; instead, it involves "understanding the concrete decision situation, and finding a way to navigate it" (p. 11). This externalizing and contextualizing of decision making means that, when it goes awry, we can describe as a kind of action failure, an agent is unable to do something in the world that they should otherwise be able to do.
Mental Illness as a Lack of Insight
Fulford identifies 'insight' as a core action failure that narrows the scope of illness to the concept of mental illness. He seems right that there is a strong conceptual connection between being aware that your mental life has gone awry in some way and your mind not being able to act in the appropriate kind of way. For example, in the case of psychosis, a lack of insight is at heart of the diagnostic judgment that a person is unwell, even though a clinician is also likely to be making a diagnosis about disease (1989, p. 219) .
The authors' discussion of metacognition and how it sometimes is and is not present for patients with ABI can be read as specifying more fully our understanding of insight. ABI2 has a reduced ability to reflect on and control his impulses, even after the case, but in a less profound way than someone who is psychotic. ABI3 seems to be aware the deficit he suffers without having the ability to control it, so we might say that he has insight (in the metacognition sense) but struggles to deal with a related action failure. One very plausible view of mental illness (and it is Fulford's) is that there is a conceptual link with a lack of insight, usually when you are mentally unwell you lack insight. ABI3 has insight, but it does not help him that much.
The authors are correct to flag the importance of metacognition and lack of awareness of deficit for decision-making capacity. An element of the In Re C test (which was subsequently dropped and does not appear in the Mental Capacity Act) is the ability to believe the information relevant to the decision (1994) . It is a test that might create ambiguity because it seems to imply that, if a patient disagreed with their clinician, they might be deemed to lack competence simply in virtue of them not believing what they have been told. However, it is clear that 'believing' refers to the ability to see the significance of information that is material to the decision. It is possible for people to be able to argue quite well about a decision, and retain material information, but to also miss the significance of that information. A similar ability is captured by the appreciation component of the McCat-T. The authors might be willing to include the ability to believe information within the category of metacognition, thereby establishing a conceptual connection between mental illness, competence, and metacognition. My view is that Owen et al. have theorized and grounded one important dimension of insight, in addition to enriching our understanding of competence and ABI
Supported Decision Making
The three impaired abilities that the authors identify in the conclusion emerge from the interviews and relevant literature. They are also psychological abilities that can be linked back to the legal view of competence. Evidence of such diminishments in ability could be very useful for reaching a judgment about someone's competence to make a specific decision, but there is another issue about what might follow from such a judgment. Although these patients with ABI have diminished abilities that are relevant to competence, they are also clearly quite capable, so sound as if they fit into that large group who are in between those who clearly cannot make their own decisions no matter how we support them, and those who clearly can make their own decisions with no assistance. It might be a subject for a possible future paper, but it would be interesting to hear what the authors think we could do to support the decision making of patients with ABI.
